COMMENTARY
IS THIS REALLY
NECESSARY?
The Agencies of California Speak
Out About the Office of
Administrative Law:
A Startling Survey
The Office of Administrative Law
was created by AB 1111 in 1979 as a
bold experiment. It was intended to
sweep out the gratuitous red-tape of
administrative rules adopted repetitiously, improperly, or without authority by
almost 200 boards, commissions, agencies, and departments in California state
government. It was written into the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
which guides almost all of state government in its adoption of rules.
This rulemaking function of state
government is extremely important; the

agencies essentially adopt laws which
govern how our economy functions,
from the entry requirements to the practice of medicine to the pesticides allowed to be sprayed on apples. Our

state is increasingly governed by these
administrative decisions. The legislature, as a generalist body inundated
with its own workload, has enacted very
general enabling statutes for a multitude
of executive bodies and given them
quasi-legislative powers to fill in the
details through adopted regulations.
The breadth of the enabling statutes

conferring this authority on agencies
allows almost boundless discretionary
power in filling the vacuum. To use our
two examples above, the law directs one
agency to "assure physician competence"
and the other to "protect the public

from hazardous agricultural chemicals."
The "what" and the "how" are substantially left to the agencies. And the
"what" and the "how" are importantthey determine the critical details of our
lives.

To assure some order to the process
for adopting these rules, the legislature

enacted the APA as a procedural statute. The political science theory here is
well-developed: a fourth branch of government in the executive vein, but with

quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative
powers, which has expertise, staff, and
time to focus on developing, adopting,

and implementing rules. The APA requires notice of proposed rules to interested parties and the public in advance,
and a public hearing or opportunity for
public comment.
There were and are problems with
agency rulemaking. One of them was
the perception that too many rules were
being adopted; they were stultifying,
incomprehensible, and-given the large
number of agencies in related areas
adopting them without coordinationoften repetitive or contradictory.
The California AB 1111 experiment
created a "super" body to review all
rules, called the "Office of Administrative Law." For every package of rules
adopted, the agencies are required to
assemble a "rulemaking file", including
a statement of purpose, the required
notices, public comments, hearing transcripts, agency responses to those comments, and studies or written evidence
relied upon. Staffed by attorneys, OAL
has thirty days to review the rule along
six criteria: authority, reference, clarity,
nonduplication, consistency and necessity. If OAL disapproves of the rule, it is
sent back to the agency for reconsideration in light of the reasons for disapproval-perhaps amounting to permanent rejection. An appeal to the Governor
of a disapproval is possible.
We were immediately critical of the
structure of the OAL review. (See CRLR
Vol. 1, No. 1 (Spring 1981) at 2 (The
Office of Administrative Law: Regulatory Reform or an Ayatollah for California?); see also CRLR Vol. 1, No. 3
(Fall 1981) at 2 (The Fallacy of Neutral
Regulatory Reform); and CRLR Vol. 5,
No. 1 (Winter 1985) at 3 (The Office
of Administrative Law: Office of Red
Tape?).)
We had a conceptual problem. We
had no problem with OAL's review of
these rules for authority, reference, clarity, nonduplication, or consistency. These
were judgments that the young generalist
attorneys making up the OAL staff
could make competently. They were
trained to examine statutory language
and intent for adequate authority to
adopt a rule, and to survey other rules

for consistency and duplication. And
the reform in arranging for such a review was a momentous one-for in the
normal course only one in every one
thousand rules is ever examined by a
court. An extraordinary writ or ancillary
challenge very occasionally causes an
examination, but almost all are simply
adopted and followed. Here we have a
guaranteed review of all rules to make
sure the agency has proper authority to
adopt it (by itself a significant reform).
And in addition, all rules are examined
for clarity, nonduplication, consistency,
etc. But we felt there was a serious
conceptual error in giving OAL the right
to reject a rule because it is not, in its
view, "necessary". "I don't think the
rule is necessary" allows rejection for a
multitude of subjective reasons. Most
important, it is a decision made by a
generalist attorney who was not the
"trier of fact," who did not observe the
witnesses who testified, and who designedly has no expertise in the subject
matter at hand.
Keep in mind two things. First, the
APA well recognizes the authority of
the agency to adopt rules free from interference as to its preferred policy. That is
why the agency exists. It has always
been unclear how this directive coexists
with an undefined directive to OAL to
reject rules that are not, in its judgment,
"necessary". Second, whenever OAL rejects a rule, whether it be a substantive,
procedural, or technical objection, it is
likely to lead the agency back to square
one. It must then begin from scratch the
drafting, notice, hearing, and adoption
process, with statements of intent, statements of small business impact, statements of housing impact, etc., etc., if it
is to rerun the OAL gauntlet. If the
entire process need be repeated, a rejection means a four-month to one-year
delay, depending upon the meeting schedules involved.
Supporters of broad OAL jurisdiction countered that they were able as
legal counsel to review the "rulemaking
file" required in every rulemaking
process. If a persuasive objection were
noted and the file indicated no persuasive rebuttal, the file itself could be
used to make a judgment. We very much
disagree with this conclusion. Upon
what basis of knowledge of the underlying subject area can a generalist attorney decide what comments of the
public warrant detailed evidentiary response, or determine that the agency's
explanation is "persuasive"? The defenders of the system could counter that this
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same argument could be used to object
to judicial review of agency decisionmaking; after all, is not a judge a nonexpert generalist? We give him or her
broad authority! But this analogy well
demonstrates the OAL jurisdictional
flaw-because courts in fact give great
weight to the findings of fact of the
agency, and respect its subject matter
expertise. Further, the court's hesitation
to substitute its judgment for an agency's
is most pronounced in the quasi-legislative arena represented by rulemaking.
Finally, the court is subject to an adversarial process directly before it.
The direct result of the "necessity"
standard is a great deal of extra work to
no constructive end. That is, the agency
knows that its rule will be reviewed by
generalists unschooled in the subject
matter. OAL does not have before it.
contending parties-where one will often
concede obvious points. Hence, every
element to a rule, and every comment or
objection, no matter how facially spurious, must have a response in the record.
A "failure to respond" to a crank letter
may be the source of an OAL rejection
as much as an informed critique by the
leading expert in the field. Therefore,
the agency studs its file with materialresponses, comments, and report-dressing, jargon-filled material. The OAL is
not expert, has no back-and-forth adversarial system to rely upon as does a
court, has heard none of the evidence
directly, and is unable to differentiate a
reasoned and persuasive response from
a pro forma spate of self-serving contentions.
What is the end result of the review
for "necessity"? We predicted that it
red tape
would mean a great deal of ...
and waste-the reduction of which is
the raison d'etre of OAL. Agencies with
recognized expertise tend not to respond
at length to spurious objections or comments which were rejected years ago or
which anyone with a minimal substantive
knowledge of the field would discountbut these are grounds for rejection by
OAL and rules are sent back for timeconsuming documentation of that which
is obvious to those responsible for regulating the field. On the other hand, a
legitimate objection can easily be facially rejected and that rejection documented by an agency in a manner which will
pass muster before any generalist reviewer. This aspect of OAL review did
indeed become known as the "BS" stimulator now clogging rulemaking files
submitted to OAL.
The framers of AB 1111 did not
understand who can best do what in a
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regulatory system. An attorney generalist is at the mercy of whoever has the
last word in a non-adversarial setting
where substantive complexity is involved.
The result is inevitably going to be
irrational decisions of little public interest use-with OAL tending to send back
that which is least appropriate for rejection and the agencies well able to gloss
over that which may well warrant rejection.
There are a number of possible solutions to this structural defect. One
counter-tactic chosen by OAL is irresponsible. OAL invites exparte contacts
with private parties interested in rulemaking. That is, OAL allows private
contact and advocacy by those interested
in rulemaking in its private chambers.
Let us say that an agency follows all of
the proper steps enumerated in the APA.
It proposes rulemaking, notices it, holds
hearings, and considers evidence from a
variety of sources. It consults its staff. It
draws upon its knowledge of the history
of regulation and of impacts of prior
rules and its relatively expert knowledge
of the subject matter. One of the interested parties to the proceeding objectsand although he has had his say in
public, he now has a private "last word"
audience with the OAL generalist attorney deciding whether to accept or reject
this rule. There is no notice of the contact to other parties who participated in
the prescribed open process, or to the
agency. A self-interested party, with his
or her own expert and jargon-filled explanations, can now have the last word
in private. When attempted before a
court with a guaranteed adversarial
process, such a tactic is unethical and
may lead to disbarment. But it is allowed here.
It is possible that the agency is controlled by special interests and such a
private contact may help the OAL prevent an abusive rule. But it is wrong to
develop a system which assumes that an
agency is always wrong or always right,
or that a party pressing an ex parte
contact is an effective check. One should
follow some very clear rules in setting
up a sensible regulatory system-and
they are not all that mysterious. Ensure
that the decisionmakers for the public
represent the public interest. Give them
expert staffs so their decisions are informed. Have a review, if you want one,
by people who are in a position to know
what they are doing. Do not extend
their powers beyond their competence.
Do not try to compensate for their lack
of expertise by introducing arbitrary
lobbying (usually by those with an im-
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mediate financial stake in the matter) in
a closed and secret process.
Government has a maddening tendency of trying to solve a bad system by
simply overlaying another level of review on top of it. This syndrome is
illustrated on the adjudicatory side of
the Administrative Procedure Act (where
the agencies impose discipline). The law
provides for a hearing and decision by a
professional administrative law judge.
But we're not always happy with the
quality, so well allow the board or
commission to review and change the
result. But how can we trust the board
or commission? We'll allow a writ of
mandate to be filed in superior court to
reexamine the whole process under what
is called the "independent judgment
test." But, superior court judges are not
perfect either, so we'll allow an appeal
to a court of appeal. Well, there should
be consistency here, so let's have a
petition for review to the state Supreme
Court. Hmm... Is there a federal issue
here? On over to that system....
It is a common phenomenon: you
take a reasonable step to allow a review;
you take another reasonable step to
allow another review; you take another
step which of itself is quite reasonableat some point you look back and realize
you have just taken five very unreasonable steps. Because you have not created
a decisionmaker you trust-with perhaps
one review for consistency-you review
the reviewer. The end result on the adjudicative side is a seven-year odyssey to
discipline a holder of a state license who
resists. The end result on the rulemaking
side is worse, because here the reviewer
is not only incompetent to apply the
"necessity" standard he is required to
use, but he also abandons the rules of
fairness which at least provide some balance in the advocacy before that review
and throughout adjudications.
The problems which have resulted
from this structure appear to be threatening what could be a largely beneficial
experiment as to the five criteria OAL
can evaluate. The result has been accusations of OAL errors, creation of gratuitous red tape, and inconsistency.
For its part, OAL has had its own
problems. It has not really been able to
complete the comprehensive review of
all rules intended by AB 1111. It has
had great difficulty in keeping up with
the current flow of new regulations as
they are adopted. Because the APA requires it to reject within thirty days, it
turned to a process of informally asking
agencies to take back rules and resubmit
them when it has resources, or agree to
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a coerced extension of time or to a long
list of demanded changes in the rule.
Failure to comply may mean pro forma
rejection.
The agencies, for their part, got
angry. They were created specifically to
make these judgments. They are responsible for rulemaking and the APA provides that substantive decisions about
rules are reserved for the agencies. But
the "necessity" standard appears to be
an exception capable of swallowing the
rule and removing their assigned task
for which they have specialized knowledge, historical perspective, and direct
confrontation with the evidence at issue,
in lieu of a young attorney staffer. They
have increasingly tried to avoid OAL
entirely. They are trying to get themselves exempt from the APA or at least
OAL review in new legislation. In fact,
exemption language from OAL is becoming almost as faddish in Sacramento
as the ubiquitous attempt to avoid malpractice exposure through "immunity"
grants. Other agencies prefer to seek
direct legislation to accomplish rule
changes rather than deal with OAL. Still
others go the other extreme and implement their rules by what is called an
"underground" procedure-they call
them "guidelines" or "interpretations"
or "policies," or in the recent case of the
Insurance Commissioner, a "bulletin."
These may look and talk like rules, but
the agencies believe if they are not
called rules, they can do it the oldfashioned way-by themselves. The result of this is the loss of the enormous
benefits of assured review for authority,
clarity, consistency, and duplication.
We heard complaints that our fears
had been realized starting in the early
1980s, but we did not know whether
they were asymptomatic. We decided to
test it with a survey. We formulated
questions and sent them to the agency
officials who deal with OAL in the 166
relevant agencies of California.
We received a completed survey from
74 agencies, an extraordinary sample.
We offered confidentiality to our respondents because of the continuing
oversight of OAL over their operations.
The ability of OAL to reject a needed
rule inhibits visible complaints by the
agencies. That inhibition is palpable to
anyone who talks with these officials
and precludes legislative scrutiny where
disclosure risks public confrontation.
Further, it is unclear to each single
agency, standing alone, whether its problems are unique to its relationship with
OAL or or whether there is a more
basic institutional and universal problem.

TABLE 1
EXCERPT FROM CPIL SURVEY
6. California's current APA-mandated procedural requirements for rulemaking
are (select one answer for each subcategory):
a.

b.

c.

(1)

4.0%

(2)

36.5%

satisfactory

(3)

35.1%

unsatisfactory

(4)

16.2%

very satisfactory

(5)

8.1%

NO OPINION

(1)

63.5%

too complicated

(2)

189

not too complicated

(3)

17.6%

NO OPINION

(1)

33.8%

not too costly for my agency

(2)

33.8%

too costly for my agency

(3)

32.4%

NO OPINION

very satisfactory

7. In considering the scope of OAL's review of rulemaking files, as currently
defined in the APA, indicate below whether each of the following IS or IS NOT
an appropriate standard of review:
a.

"authority"

86.5%

IS

5.4%

IS NOT

8.1%

NO OPINION

b.

"reference"

79.7%

IS

10.8%

IS NOT

9.5%

NO OPINION

c.

"clarity"

79.7%

IS

12.2_

IS NOT

8.1%

NO OPINION

d.

"necessity"

52.7%

IS

39.2%_

IS NOT

8.1%

NO OPINION

e.

"nonduplication" 70.3%

IS

21.6%0_

IS NOT

8.1%

NO OPINION

f.

"consistency"

IS

16.2%

IS NOT

9.5%

NO OPINION

74.3%

8. In reviewing my agency's rulemaking files during the period from 1/1/87
through 3/31/88, OAL's application of the
CONSISTENT

INCONSISTENT

NO OPINION
43.2%
45.9%o

a.

AUTHORITY standard was

47.3.

b.

REFERENCE standard was

44.6%

c.

CLARITY standard was

27.0%

35.1%i

d.

NECESSITY standard was

23.0%

ik
37.8%i

e.

NONDUPLICATION standard was

37.8%

50.0%

f.

CONSISTENCY standard was

40.5%

45.9%z

37.8%_
39.2%

9. A comprehensive evaluation of California's rulemaking and regulatory review
process
(1) 73.0% is needed.

(2) 12.2% is not needed

(3) 14.9% NO OPINION

10. A performance evaluation of OAL
(1) 68.9% is needed.

(2) 12.2% is not needed.

3) 18.9% NO OPINION

13. a. Since the creation of OAL, my agency (select one):
(1) 56.7% HAS

(2) 36.5% HAS NOT

( 3) 6.8% DON'T KNOW

sometimes pursued statutory amendments in lieu of regulatory changes because
of a desire to avoid the rulemaking process.
b. (answer only if you checked answer #1 in question #13)
Reasons for avoiding the rulemaking process: (check one or more)
(1) 28.5% COST

(2) 47.6% CONVENIENCE (3) 90.4% FRUSTRATION
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The survey was directed to the agency
official responsible for OAL rulemaking
coordination. The first five questions of
the survey were statistical questions
about the number of rules adopted, the
experience of the person responding, etc.
In Table 1,we present the substantive
questions exactly as they appeared on
the survey, with the tabulation of responses:
These results are startling indeed.
Forgetting the matter of percentages,
the fact that more than one-half of 74
agencies responding-or 38 different
agencies-view the APA rulemaking requirements as "unsatisfactory or very
unsatisfactory" should alarm any observer. Any temptation to dismiss complaints as "sour grapes" from agencies
who have attempted to adopt unnecessary or gratuitous rules and been thwarted by an agency operating according to
legislative intent is belied by the detailed
responses. The agencies do not begrudge
the OAL a review, and specifically support by margins of 3-to-I to 9-to-I its
evaluation of five of the six criteria. The
"necessity" standard wins approval as
"an appropriate standard of review" by
only a 5-to-4 margin. Further, a majority of agencies who have confronted
OAL "necessity" rejection are hostile to
its use. That hostility is not manifested
for the other standards, notwithstanding
common rule rejection on those other
bases. Further, the necessity and clarity
standards were applied "inconsistently"
38% to 23% and 35% to 27%, respectively. The other standards were adjudged
consistently applied.
By a vote of 63.5% to 18.9%, the
respondents view the rulemaking process
as too complicated. Perhaps most important, these officials candidly admit,
by 56.7% to 36.5%, that they have "pursued statutes" rather than rulemaking to
avoid OAL. It is indeed a sad commentary if an agency views the legislative
process as easier and less cumbersome
than the administrative process-especially when the agencies themselves are supposed to be the repository of rulemaking
power. They may already have the votes
for a rule by those empowered to so
decide-but the act of going through
OAL has become so frustrating that
burdening further the legislative process
is preferred! The fact that 90.4% of those
who have pursued statutory change
rather than rulemaking identified "frustration" with OAL (Question 13b) as a
reason is indicative of a very serious
breakdown.
"Underground rulemaking" by declaring rules "policies" and avoiding the
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useful OAL review for authority, duplication, etc., the imposition of yet another layer of red tape, and the burdening of the legislature with specific
statutory changes which could otherwise
be accomplished by rulemaking is not
what the Legislature envisioned for the
Office of Administrative Law experiment.
Some of the sua sponte comments
penned in by the agency officials dealing
with OAL further amplify the problem.
Following are comments, each from a
different agency:
"Evidently, the OAL attorneys are
evaluated on how many disapprovals
they write. This is like evaluating a cop
on how many tickets he writes."
"The staff at OAL is inexperienced,
has a poor understanding of the law,
chronically substitutes its own judgment
for that of the agency."
"OAL uses the standards to substitute its judgment for the policy decisions
of the agency."
"OAL's goal is good. Their process
is terrible."
"It's often faster to get changes
through the legislature than from OAL."
"Necessity' is the most inappropriate
standard since OAL can substitute its
judgment for the agencies."
"Perhaps it would be wiser for OAL
to review the regulations before an
agency spends so much time and money
on public hearings, mass mailings, etc."
"OAL is too big of a bureaucracy."
"Time required to implement a regulation takes longer than the legislative
process."
"Review of proposed regulations is
often petty and superficial, which is all
we could expect of reviewers who know
little or nothing about the subject matter
of the regulations. Some reviewers tend
to look upon proposed regulations as
'issue hunts' more appropriate to answering law school exam questions."
"Racking up disapprovals of regulations for slight technical problems does
not make OAL's stats credible in the
eyes of departments. OAL formalities
for rule language change after notice of
proposed action is out and public comment received is onerous (and results in
repetitive notice and comment proceedings) ...not what the Legislature intended."
"My biggest complaint is the inevitable phone call I receive on the 29th day
of OAL review [after which a rule must
be approved]...'we have a few problems
with your file.' They then proceed with
a long list of problems, many or most of
which are none of their business. And
every time they threaten you, that if you
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don't accept all of their changes, they
will disapprove the file. You have very
little power in this situation. So in my
opinion, the published disapprovals are
just part of the problem...I worry what
changes OAL will require that are purely subjective and infringe upon the program implementing authority of my
agency."
"...if a witness objects to a provision
of a regulation, there is no way the
agency can 'sell' OAL on the validity of
the regulation. In one instance, a reg
was rejected because one witness objected to a standard even though the agency
repeatedly told him the standard did not
apply in the circumstances he described.
OAL stated that we had failed to respond to his objection! ... To preserve
our sanity, I would rather negotiate with
lobbyists and swim with other sharks
than have ANY dealing with OAL!"
"The process of addressing the necessity for each and every provision of a
rule or form is especially tedious."
"It does try to second guess agencies
which are more aware of technical problems before them."
"My agency is [partially] exempt...I
feel very fortunate to have this exemption."
"The Governor's Office provides little, if any, oversight over OAL. This is
unfortunate and allows OAL to be arbitrary and heavy handed."
The answers to questions 9 and 10
indicate a very strong desire by the
agencies for legislative review of the
momentous changes wrought by AB 1111
in 1979 (although one of the few respondents opposing such a review noted:
"why hassle OAL with a review, just
limit their power').
The agencies might be somewhat
more angry if they paid attention to
their accounting. OAL is a "general
services" agency which bills specialfunded agencies (most of them heavily
involved in writing regulations) for its
services. The Auditor General, Office of
Attorney General, Office of Administrative Hearings, and other agencies do
likewise. The AG will cost you about
$75 per hour. Not cheap, but he or she
is there to help you and attorneys do
not come cheap. How much do you
think the most recent calculation for
special-fund billing for OAL services
came to? $240 per hour. That is how
much the special-fund agencies writing
most of these rules and having the
above-described problems have to pay
from their budget for the privilege.
Almost ten years have passed since
the momentous changes of AB 1111 were
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effectuated. The time has come for a
review. California led in proposing the
concept, as it leads in many innovative
regulatory areas. It should now lead in
refining it so its abuses and excesses are
controlled and its advantages are allowed
to flourish.

Letters To The Editor
August 23, 1988
Regulatory Law Reporter:
In response to the "Open Letter to
Our Colleagues in the Media" in your
summer issue, here's a closed letter:
Kindly take my name off your mailing
list.
If your premises are correct, I'm too
stupid and corrupt to be reading your
publication-or anything else.
Claire Cooper
The Sacramento Bee
Editor's Response:

Well, isn't that special?
For those of you who missed our
critique (see CRLR Vol. 8, No. 3 (Summer 1988) p. 10), we did not accuse
journalists of being personally stupid or
corrupt. We argued that the media is
biased in carrying out the most important part of its job-the selection of what
to cover. This bias is not politically
partisan but is guided by journalistic
"subculture rules." These rules do not
emanate from consumer demand in any
marketplace; instead, the media has created its own demand and its own reality
and is governed by a series of complex
mores. These rules can be pervasive and
general: e.g., dog biting man is not a
story, but man biting dog is; so look for
the unusual and the exceptional, and
select stories which depict what is generally not reality. This then leads to
a overwhelming bias toward the "petty
irony" in coverage.
And these rules can also be very
specific: e.g., the rule that "a Presidential candidate cannot cry; if he or
she does, he or she is disqualified for the
office." (Although applied to Schroeder
and Muskie, this rule was never applied
to Hubert Humphrey because he emoted
a great deal, and its lack of "petty irony"
content ameliorated the specific "Candidates Cannot Cry" rule.)
We also argued that journalists, like

most of us, have become horizontally
acculturated and identify strongly with
their peers. This is manifested in the
rule that any story covered by another
journalist is automatically worthy of
coverage (even if unsubstantiated or
wrong). And we argued that journalists
and the media in general have ignored
real issues which people do care about:
health care, ozone depletion, population
control, government corruption-important issues which are not dramatically
focused into one of the several easilyidentifiable "acceptable" categories:
those dealing with crime or conflict,
deviant or smarmy sex, or affecting the
life of a celebrity.
We noted that journalists should
admit that their values and group reinforcements affect the subjects they
choose to report. Out of the millions of
facts and events occurring every day,
they choose an infinitesimal number to
cover and they all follow similar criteria, which are not market-determined.
What determines that the conduct of
Cher's boyfriend should consume
precious airtime and printspace, while
the daily deaths of 20,000 children from
easily preventable dehydration are
ignored? Journalists and the media, increasingly preoccupied with "lifestyles
of the rich and famous" and the sniggering sexual innuendo of Geraldo- and
Oprah-type talk and "magazine" shows,
pretend that they are "neutral" reflectors of public demand. We contend that
is nonsense.
Since our long commentary was written, some interesting things have happened. The FBI has apparently been
documenting the everyday corruption
which the journalists of Sacramento
have felt does not warrant attention.
The media has interacted with the Presidential candidates to produce issueless
silliness: Quayle's flirtation with a
woman years ago, the pledge of allegiance, countless photo opportunities,
and one-liner "sound bite" putdowns.
Barry Goldwater has been moved to tell
his own party's nominee to "cut it out."
Barry always suffered that fatal political
flaw: personal candor.
Ms. Cooper's response is interesting,
because it comes from a rather good
journalist (and we are not cancelling the
Bee's subscription in retaliation) and
from a publication which may be one of
the exceptions proving the rule. For that
reason it underlines our thesis: those in
the media are horizontally acculturated
and feel personally offended when their
peer group is criticized. This is the
source of the bias problem which we

address; that unquestioning acculturation; that tribal loyalty.
What is most amusing about it is
that is makes a good story under the
distorted criteria of the media subculture: it is a classic petty irony. Here is a
journalist who gets the critique wrong,
and then gets defensive because she,
who spends much of her career writing
criticisms of others (whether from her
or from those she interviews), cannot
stand criticism coming back at her-and
not even criticism of her, but of her
profession. And what is her response?
She did what she and her peers laugh at
when it comes from those they cover: "I
did not like your editorial, you are a
commie, cancel my subscription." In
this case, the final petty irony is that she
takes offense at allegedly being called
ignorant and then retaliates by refusing
to read the major source of information
about agency actions in the state. Well,
she showed us!
For those who want to read what
got Ms. Cooper so upset, we will make
reprints available at no cost for all who
request them. And we challenge our colleagues in the media to reprint it, discuss it, respond to it.
As to Ms. Cooper's and similar responses from the media pooh-bahs of
California: we rest our case.
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